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STRATEGIC 
COMMUNICATIONS, 
BOKO HARAM, AND  
COUNTER-INSURGENCY
Abdullahi Tasiu Abubakar
Abstract
Strategic communications is gaining traction as a potent tool of  countering insurgency. 
State and non-state actors—including insurgent groups—are increasingly turning to it 
in pursuit of  their goals. This article offers a comparative study of  the use of  strategic 
communications by both the Nigerian Armed Forces and the jihadi group they seek to 
obliterate: Boko Haram. It also assesses their impact on the media coverage of  their 
activities. The jihadists deployed both their communications skills and their infamies to 
put their insurgency onto the global scene. The Army employed a range of  tools—some 
effective, some less so—to counter them. The media’s obsession with jihadi stories 
gave the insurgents an edge, but the Army managed to disrupt most of  their strategies. 
Extraneous factors do influence strategic communications campaigns, but honesty—or 
the perception of  it—is a necessary condition for their long-term efficacy. 
Keywords: Boko Haram, counter-insurgency, jihadists, militants, Nigerian Army, strategic 
communication, strategic communications
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Introduction
On 29 July 2017 the Nigerian Army did something they rarely do: they apologised 
for issuing a false statement.1 It was in respect of  a setback they had suffered in their 
war with the jihadi2 group Boko Haram. Four days earlier the group had ambushed 
and kidnapped a team of  oil explorers and their ancillary staff  who were under Army 
and vigilante group3 protection. In the false statement,4 the Army had claimed to have 
rescued all the explorers and seized weapons from the insurgents. In reality, it was the 
dead bodies of  some of  the explorers, their supporting staff, soldiers, and members 
of  the vigilante group that they had managed to recover.5 The families and colleagues 
of  the victims cried foul.6 And Boko Haram released a video showing three surviving 
1 Director of  Army Public Relations Brigadier General Sani Kukasheka Usman issued the statement, 
which was widely reported by the Nigerian media. See Ronald Mutum, ‘Abducted oil workers: Army 
apologises for misleading the public, recovers 21 additional bodies’, Daily Trust, 30 July 2017, https://
www.dailytrust.com.ng/news/general/abducted-oil-workers-army-apologises-for-misleading-public-re-
covers-21-additional-bodies/207747.html (accessed 30 July 2017). The Nigerian Army published the 
statement on its official website too. They used the phrase ‘highly regrettable’ but buried it deep beneath 
a vague headline: ‘Update on Oil Exploration Team Ambush’: http://www.army.mil.ng/update-on-oil-ex-
ploration-team-ambush/ (accessed 30 July 2017). 
2 The terms ‘jihadi group’, ‘insurgent group’, and ‘militant group’ are used interchangeably in this article. 
Jihadi is used here in the same sense the news outlets in the West use it to refer to a violent extremist 
group. It is radically different from the term ‘jihad’ in Islam, which simply means struggle to uphold 
righteous deeds.  
3 The vigilante group is a team of  armed youths, formed by local communities in the northeast, to 
counter the Boko Haram militancy. They are sometimes called ‘Civilian JTF’ (Joint Task Force) and often 
work as a support team for the Nigerian Armed Forces, largely because of  their excellent knowledge of  
the local terrains.
4 The statement, which was issued by the same Brigadier General Usman on 26 July 2017, was reported 
by several news outlets. See Idris Ibrahim and Abdulkareen Haruna, ‘Nigerian Army announces res-
cue of  kidnapped NNPC officials, says nine soldiers killed’, Premium Times, 26 July 2017, http://www.
premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/238267-nigerian-army-announces-rescue-kidnapped-nnpc-offi-
cials-says-nine-soldiers-killed.html (accessed 26 July 2017). It was also published on the Army’s website: 
‘Update on Search and Rescue of  NNPC Staff ’: http://www.army.mil.ng/update-on-search-and-rescue-
of-nnpc-staff/ (accessed 27 July 2017). And ironically, it remained on the website for many weeks after 
the retraction. 
5 Media reports say more than 45 people were killed. See Hamza Idris, Ibrahim Sawab, and Yusha’u Ibra-
him, ‘45 killed, many missing in Boko Haram ambush on oil workers’, Daily Trust, 28 July 2017 https://
www.dailytrust.com.ng/news/general/45-killed-many-missing-in-boko-haram-ambush-on-oil-work-
ers/207500.html (accessed 29 July 2017).
6 For instance, the Vice Chancellor of  the University of  Maiduguri, Professor Abubakar Njodi, whose 
younger brother and staff  were among those killed, criticised the Army for describing ‘the recovery of  
corpses’ as the rescue of  the victims. See Abdulkareem Haruna and Idris Ibrahim, ‘NNPC Ambush: UN-
IMAID Vice Chancellor faults Nigerian Army, says nobody rescued’, Premium Times, 28 July 2017: http://
www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/238453-nnpc-ambush-unimaid-vice-chancellor-faults-nigeri-
an-army-says-nobody-rescued.html (accessed 28 July 2017).
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members of  the exploration team in their custody.7 The three—two geologists who are 
lecturers at the University of  Maiduguri and their driver—said in the video that they 
were being held hostage by the militants. They pleaded with the Nigerian authorities to 
negotiate with the insurgents to secure their freedom. It was a complete repudiation of  
the Army’s claim. And so, with the Nigerian public getting more accurate reports of  the 
incident from other sources, the Army had no viable option but to admit that their own 
original statement was false. 
They would have saved themselves from this humiliating experience, had they not 
ignored one of  the key tenets of  strategic communications: truth-telling. The retraction 
itself—which earned them some praise8—was actually a more dignifying act than their 
previous tradition of  telling untruths and keeping quiet. A few days before this incident, 
the Chief  of  Army Staff, Lieutenant General Tukur Yusufu Buratai, had given his troops 
a 40-day ultimatum to capture the leader of  Boko Haram, Abubakar Shekau, dead or 
alive.9 The Army had made multiple claims of  killing or maiming the militants’ leader.10 
Issuing the ultimatum was a confirmation that the Army had deliberately misinformed 
the public in the past. 
In the brutal war they have been waging against the jihadists since 2009, the Nigerian 
Army have actually been winning the gun battle in the field, though not as effectively 
and as accurately as they have been representing to the public. They have retaken 
most of  the territory once seized by the militants, killed many of  their commanders 
and young fighters, and forced a significant number of  them to surrender. But it is 
in the ‘communications battlespace’11 that the insurgents often outwit their superior 
opponents. And this has often been helped by lapses in the Army’s narratives. Unknown 
to military officials, any time they issue a false statement about their encounters with 
7 The video, which was apparently recorded on 28 July 2017, was shared on YouTube: https://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=X5q8pTK7pzw (accessed 30 July 2017). Boko Haram—the faction led by Abu 
Musab al-Barnawi, which kidnapped them—released the video immediately after the Army had claimed 
to have rescued the explorers. The captives specifically called for negotiation with al-Barnawi, something 
that raised questions about a previous claim that he had been arrested by the Nigerian security forces. 
8 Asaju, Tunde, ‘Towards a Positive Army-media Relations’, Daily Trust, 2 August 2017.
9 See ‘Capture Shekau “dead or alive”, Buratai directs Commander’, The Nation, 22 July 2017: http://
thenationonlineng.net/capture-shekau-dead-alive-buratai-directs-commander/ (accessed 22 July 2017).
10 See, for instance, Festus Ewete’s analysis in Premium Times: http://www.premiumtimesng.com/
news/headlines/238515-analysis-nigerian-military-repeatedly-claimed-killed-boko-haram-leader-abuba-
kar-shekau.html (accessed 29 July 2017). There were occasions when the Army admitted that Shekau 
had not been captured, but they didn’t admit providing false information. One example is the report in 
Premium Times, ‘Why We Are Yet to Capture Shekau – DHQ’, 30 March 2017: http://thenationonlineng.
net/yet-capture-shekau-dhq/ (accessed 30 March 2017).
11 Giesea, Jeff, ‘It’s Time to Embrace Memetic Warfare’, Defence Strategic Communications, 1(1), (2015), p. 
71.
Defence Strategic Communications | Volume 3 | Autumn 2017
142
Boko Haram, they indirectly empower the jihadists. For, as academics Mervyn Frost 
and Nicholas Michelsen have argued elsewhere, non-adherence to truth telling creates 
‘opportunities that empower even very weak hostile actors and undermine the basic 
structural conditions on which even the strongest actors’ credibility is rooted’.12  
The problem probably stemmed from the Army’s misconception or misapplication of  
strategic communications, though in fairness to them they do not claim to be using it.13 
The terms they frequently use are ‘public relations’, ‘public affairs’, ‘defence information’, 
and ‘crisis communication’ (all components of  strategic communications)14—but all of  
which they tend to misapply because none of  them advocates using misinformation as a 
tool. The narrow scope of  the military’s communications strategy—they seem to target 
only domestic audiences, apparently in compliance with their specific remits—is an 
additional constraint, especially as they are, in reality, dealing with an issue that extends 
far beyond the borders of  Nigeria. This might explain their use of  terminologies that 
are of  narrower scope than strategic communications, which is usually associated with 
communication with external audiences. Yet their task is of  the magnitude that only a 
skilful application of  strategic communications techniques could address. But, like many 
military formations, the Nigerian Army appears to equate strategic communications 
with spin.15 It is perhaps a hangover of  the entrenched tradition of  using propaganda 
as part of  military campaigns. But as communications expert John Williams points out:
Strategic communications is not propaganda, nor psychological operations, nor 
information ops, nor spin—all of  which involve an intention to mislead in some 
way. Strategic communications is about strategic impact through credible narrative. 
In complex situations, where reasonable people can hold different views or see the 
problem from different angles, strategic communications is an honest attempt—always 
honest—to frame the way people around the world understand what is at stake.16
12 Frost, Mervyn and Nicholas Michelsen, ‘Strategic Communications in International Relations: Practical 
Traps and Ethical Puzzles’, Defence Strategic Communications, 2, (2017), p. 22.
13 Former National Security Adviser Sambo Dasuki does use the term ‘strategic communications’, but 
other security officials rarely do. Most references made here are to the Nigerian Army because they are 
the ones leading the counter-insurgency campaigns. And the words ‘Army’ and ‘military’ are often used 
here interchangeably.  
14 See Farwell, James P., Persuasion and Power: The Art of  Strategic Communication. (Washington, DC: George-
town University Press, 2012).
15 See Thomas, Timothy, ‘Russia’s 21st Century Information War: Working to Undermine and Destabilize 
Populations’, Defence Strategic Communications, 1(1), (2015), 11–26. Even NATO’s strategic communications 
definition includes psychological operations (see, NATO, ‘NATO Strategic Communications Policy’, 
NATO Unclassified, (SG (2009)0794) 14 September 2009).  
16 Williams, John, ‘Weaponised Honesty: Communication Strategy and NATO Values’, Defence Strategic 
Communications, 2, (2017), p. 205.
Strategic Communications, Boko Haram, and Counter-Insurgency
143
The lack of  credible narratives is a major lapse in the Army’s counter-insurgency efforts. 
On numerous occasions the military would issue half-truths or untruths that were easily 
punctured by the militants or simply detected by the public. Their repeated claims of  
Shekau’s death, for instance, were effectively countered by the insurgents with simple 
releases of  their leader’s video and audio recordings to prove that he was still alive 
and unharmed.17 Each successful rebuttal of  such claims erodes the credibility of  the 
Army and enhances that of  the jihadists. It is not that the Boko Haram militants do 
not exaggerate their claims or spread outright falsehoods; they do. But they tend to 
give the media more credible accounts of  events than the Nigerian military does. This 
strengthens their standing as news sources and increases the visibility of  their narratives 
in the media. But, of  course, it is the media’s obsession with jihadi stories that helps lift 
them out of  their relative obscurity and put them onto the global scene.18 As will be 
explained later, a growing body of  literature has shown that the media’s preoccupation 
with covering terrorism and Islamist militancy, as well as the jihadists’ quest for publicity, 
has helped generate much more media attention to insurgents and terrorists than they 
deserve.19
This article examines the communications strategies of  both the Nigerian Army and 
the Boko Haram militants, and broadly assesses their impact on the media coverage 
of  the jihadi insurgency and counter-insurgency in Nigeria. The data was drawn from 
interviews with journalists and public relations officers;20 analysis of  Boko Haram’s 
video and audio messages; the researcher’s personal reflections, as he has covered the 
Boko Haram insurgency as a journalist working for both the BBC World Service and 
the Nigerian Daily Trust newspapers; library research; and analysis of  the press releases 
17 In one such video, given to the online news outlet Sahara Reporters, the Boko Haram leader denied that 
he was injured in a military airstrike. Sahara Reporters, ‘Boko Haram Leader, Shekau, Releases New Video 
to Prove He Wasn’t Injured in Nigerian Air Force Bombardment’, 4 May 2017: http://saharareporters.
com/2017/05/04/boko-haram-leader-shekau-releases-new-video-prove-he-wasnt-injured-nigerian-air-
force (accessed 5 May 2017).
18 Abubakar, Abdullahi Tasiu, ‘Communicating Violence: The Media Strategies of  Boko Haram’ in Afri-
ca’s Media Image in the 21st Century: From the ‘Heart of  Darkness’ to ‘Africa Rising’, eds. M. Bunce, S. Franks and 
C. Paterson, (Oxford: Routledge, 2016), pp. 200–210.
19 See Weimann, Gabriel, ‘The Theater of  Terror: Effects of  Press Coverage’, Journal of  Communication, 
33(1), (1983), 38–45; Weimann, Gabriel, ‘The Role of  the Media in Propagating Terrorism’ in Countering 
Terrorism: Psychosocial Strategies, eds. U. Kumar and M.K. Mandal, (Thousand Oaks, California: Sage, 2012), 
pp. 182–200; Lynch, Marc,  ‘Al-Qaeda’s Media Strategies’, National Interest, 83, (2006), 50–56; Moeller, 
Susan, Packaging Terrorism: Co-opting the News for Politics and Profit. (Chichester, West Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell, 
2009); Farwell, James P., ‘The Media Strategy of  ISIS’, Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, 56(6), (2014), 
49–55; and Nacos, Brigitte L., Mass-mediated Terrorism: Mainstream and Digital Media in Terrorism and Counter-
terrorism, 3rd ed., (Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield, 2016).
20 Part of  the data was obtained from the individual interviews conducted with twelve Nigerian journal-
ists, two police public relations officers, and two former army public relations officers. The interviews 
were done in the months of  January, April, and July 2017.
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and web content generated by the Nigerian Armed Forces (in particular those of  the 
Defence Headquarters, the Nigerian Army, the Nigerian Air Force, and the Nigeria 
Police Force). 
The Army versus Boko Haram
The Army were not the primary adversaries of  the Boko Haram insurgents;21 politicians 
and police were. The jihadists were first critical of  politicians whom they accuse of  
corruption and breach of  trust. They then added the police who protect the politicians 
and enforce their laws. And when they began their uprising in July 2009, they were 
primarily confronting the Borno State Government and the police, who were trying 
to enforce a law that stipulates the wearing of  helmets by motorcyclists, which the 
insurgents hate and routinely violate. It was the failure of  the police to contain them 
that prompted the then President Umaru Musa Yar’adua to bring in the Army. The 
military suppressed the uprising, arrested the founder of  the group, Muhammad Yusuf, 
and handed him over to the police in Maiduguri, Borno State’s capital and Boko Haram’s 
main base.22 Yusuf  was killed while in police custody,23 an act that was believed to have 
further radicalised the group and made its members more violent. There was a renewed 
uprising followed by a full insurgency, and the Army became the group’s main adversary. 
With the escalation of  the insurgency came a wider involvement of  the armed forces. By 
2013, almost all the Nigerian armed forces and intelligence agencies were drafted into 
the counter-insurgency campaigns, which the Office of  the National Security Adviser 
coordinates. This article assesses the overall communications strategy employed in this 
counter-insurgency work, focusing mainly on the Army’s part and making references to 
that of  the entire military and the Defence Headquarters. 
The Army has long been playing the lead role in the campaign, although there have 
been changes in strategy and in the structure and scope of  the communications team, 
which have often been occasioned by changes of  governments or of  personnel. During 
the Yar’adua administration it was the Army that handled the media strategy, operating 
mostly from Maiduguri. The Department of  State Services (DSS)—the domestic 
intelligence agency usually called the State Security Service (SSS)—was involved more 
in security operations but less in open communications. This system continued in the 
early part of  President Goodluck Jonathan’s administration under the supervision 
21 The words ‘insurgents’, ‘jihadists’, and ‘militants’ are used here to describe Boko Haram members 
because of  the political nature of  their activities, although most of  their activities fall within the definition 
of  terrorism. The Nigerian government and the armed services actually call them terrorists and their 
actions terrorism. In this article, the term ‘insurgency’ is often used to describe their activities—again, due 
to the perceived political intentions of  the actions.
22 Smith, Mike, Boko Haram: Inside Nigeria’s Unholy War, (London: I.B. Tauris, 2015).
23 Ibid.
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of  the then National Security Adviser retired General Andrew Azazi. But when the 
insurgency intensified, the strategy was modified. The involvement of  other agencies, 
both in direct security operations and in public communications, was expanded. This 
was further widened when retired Colonel Sambo Dasuki became the National Security 
Adviser in 2012. ‘That was the time when we saw a lot of  media effort and greater 
involvement of  other agencies in the counter-terrorism work,’ observed a former Army 
public relations officer.24 The busiest period was perhaps between 2013 and 2015 when 
the power of  the Boko Haram insurgents was at its peak. The military was doing badly 
in the battlefield and was using a media campaign to cover it up, noted many journalists 
interviewed for this piece. Now it was the Defence Headquarters in Abuja—not the 
Army base in Maiduguri—that was in clear control of  public communications, with 
Major General Chris Olukolade, the then Director of  Defence Information, overseeing 
the production and distribution of  most of  the media content. 
Another feature of  the communications strategy at that time was the establishment of  
the Forum of  Spokespersons of  Security and Response Agencies (FOSSRA), which 
includes representatives of  the military, paramilitary, intelligence, and response agencies. 
The 17-member forum was made up of  spokespersons from the Nigerian Defence 
Headquarters, the Nigerian Army, the Nigerian Air Force, the Nigerian Navy, the Office 
of  the National Security Adviser, the National Intelligence Agency, the Department 
of  State Services, and the Nigeria Police Force, as well as officers from the Economic 
and Financial Crimes Commission, the Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps, the 
Nigeria Customs Service, the Nigeria Immigration Service, the Nigerian Prisons Service, 
the National Emergency Management Agency, the Federal Fire Service, and the Federal 
Road Safety Commission.25 A public relations specialist, Yushua Shuaib, engaged by the 
Office of  the National Security Adviser, was the media consultant to the forum.26 Their 
open function focused mainly on public relations work. They ran their own website 
and held monthly meetings in Abuja during which they would often give journalists an 
update on the campaigns against the Boko Haram insurgency.27 It was an important 
component of  the overall strategic communications setting. But it didn’t last long. 
When President Muhammadu Buhari assumed office after defeating President Jonathan 
in the 2015 general elections, he appointed a new National Security Adviser, retired Major 
General Babagana Monguno, and new Defence, Army, Navy, and Air Force Chiefs. With 
these changes there also came a shift in media strategy. FOSSRA still exists but has lesser 
24 Interview with the researcher in Abuja in July 2017.
25 Shuaib, Yushau, Boko Haram Media War: An Encounter with the Spymaster, (Abuja: Image Merchants 
Promotions, 2017), p. 275.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid.
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involvement in public communications work. Shuaib, the media consultant, resigned a 
few months after former National Security Adviser Sambo Dasuki, the person who 
hired him, was arrested and taken to court on corruption charges—which he denies.28 
The media visibility of  the Defence Headquarters was significantly curtailed. And the 
Army regained its leading role in handling public communications. The other security 
services continue to play different roles in the overall communications strategy, though 
not as much as they were doing previously. However, being conventional security 
institutions operating under formal government structures, they all publicly maintain 
their conventional relationship with one another, and with the media.
Boko Haram’s case is radically different. First, the group is a secretive extremist Islamic 
sect whose ideology was originally rooted in Salafism,29 from which it has since deviated. 
Even before its members went underground in 2009, many of  their activities were 
shrouded in mystery. The name ‘Boko Haram’ itself—meaning ‘Western education is 
sinful’—is not the group’s real name. The jihadists actually detest it. They want to be 
called Jama’atu Ahlus Sunna lid Da’awatu wal-Jihad (approximately ‘Movement for the 
Propagation and Enthronement of  Righteous Deeds’) or al-Wilaayat al-Islamiyyah Gharb 
Afriqiyyah (the Islamic State’s West African Province)—their new name after pledging 
allegiance to the so-called Islamic State group in 2015. Founded by Muhammad Yusuf  
in Nigeria’s northeast in 2002,30 Boko Haram was originally a peaceful movement. But 
its liaisons with politicians and clashes with security forces turned it into Nigeria’s most 
violent terror group.31 The July 2009 uprising, in which more than 800 people (mostly 
its members) were killed, was one of  the most radicalising events for the group.32 It 
was after that violence that its members went underground. They resurfaced a year 
later with Shekau as their new leader. He spearheads their deadly campaigns—which 
include bombing schools, churches, mosques, and markets, and kidnapping for ransom 
and for sexual enslavement.33 They also engage in bank robberies, cattle rustling, and 
raiding towns and villages in Nigeria and in neighbouring Niger, Chad, and Cameroon.34 
28 The former National Security Adviser was arrested and later taken to court in December 2015 in 
connection with alleged arms procurement fraud (see BBC, ‘Nigeria’s Sambo Dasuki charged over ‘$68m 
fraud’, 14 December 2015: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/amp/world-africa-35093785 (accessed 14 
December 2015). PR consultant Shuaib resigned few months later (see Shuiab, Boko Haram Media War, p. 
275).
29 Meijer, Roel (ed.), Global Salafism: Islam’s New Religious Movement, (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2009).
30 Smith, Boko Haram. 
31 Amnesty International, ‘Our Job is to Shoot, Slaughter and Kill’: Boko Haram’s Reign of  Terror in 
North-east Nigeria’, (London: Amnesty International, 2015), AFR44/1360/2015, pp. 1–98.
32 Smith, Boko Haram.
33 Abubakar, ‘Communicating Violence’.
34 Ibid.
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Although it was their abduction of  276 schoolgirls from Chibok in Borno State in April 
2014 that gave them global notoriety, Boko Haram militants have committed far worse 
atrocities, such as beheadings and mass executions.35 They seized swathes of  territory 
in north-eastern Nigeria where they declared their caliphate. At one time (between mid-
2014 and early 2015), they were controlling a territory the size of  Belgium, upon which 
they imposed their own version of  Islamic law, beheading suspected spies and stoning 
to death those they convicted of  adultery.36 The 2015 report of  the Global Terrorism 
Index describes Boko Haram as the world’s deadliest terror group.37 
It took a reorganisation of  the Nigerian Armed Forces and coordinated responses from 
the neighbouring armies to dislodge the jihadists from much of  the captured territory. 
The formation of  the multinational force, called the Multi-National Joint Task Force 
(MNJTC), made up of  troops from Nigeria, Niger, Chad, Cameroon, and Benin did 
help in strengthening the regional response; but it was not until the Nigerian military 
had put its house in order that the jihadists were contained. Boko Haram has since split 
into two—one faction led by Shekau and the other by Abu Musab Yusuf  al-Barnawi,38 
son of  its founder Muhammad Yusuf. But even with this split, both camps have been 
carrying out suicide bombings, raiding villages, kidnapping vulnerable people, and 
inflicting losses on the Army. The overall impact of  the eight-year insurgency has not 
been fully assessed (as the crisis is still going on and some areas are still inaccessible 
to researchers), but an estimated 20,000 to 30,000 lives are reported to have been lost 
and about three million people displaced. In Nigeria’s northeast alone, the economic 
impact amounts to $9 billion, and, as of  September 2017, some 10.7 million people 
require humanitarian assistance, according to a United Nations briefing.39 Researchers 
have identified various reasons for the emergence of  Boko Haram, among which are 
poor governance, Nigeria’s endemic corruption, youth unemployment, chronic poverty, 
incompetent security agencies, the rise of  jihadi ideology in response to the West’s war 
on terror, British colonial legacy, and a lack of  adequate education.40 
35 Amnesty International, ‘Our Job is to Shoot, Slaughter and Kill’.
36 Ibid.
37 Institute for Economics and Peace, ‘Global Terrorism Index 2015: Measuring and Understanding the 
Impact of  Terrorism’, November 2015/IEP Report 36: http://economicsandpeace.org/wp-content/
uploads/2015/11/Global-Terrorism-Index-2015.pdf  (accessed 12 January 2016).
38 The real leader of  al-Barnawi’s faction is believed to be Muhammad Nur, the alleged mastermind of  
the 2011 UN Building bombing in Abuja. He, like Shekau, was once a deputy to al-Barnawi’s father. 
39 United Nations, ‘Security Council Briefing on the Situation in the Lake Chad Basin, Under-Sec-
retary-General Jeffrey Feltman’, 13 September 2017: http://www.un.org/undpa/en/speeches-state-
ments/13092017/lake-chad-basin (accessed 12 October 2017).
40 See UNDP, Journey to Extremism in Africa: Drivers, Incentives and the Tipping Point for Recruitment, (New 
York: UNDP, 2017); Abubakar, ‘Communicating Violence’; Smith, Boko Haram; and Herskovits, Jean, 
‘The Real Tragedy in Nigeria’s Violence’, Foreign Policy, 3 August 2009: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/
articles/2009/08/03/the_real_tragedy_in_nigerias_ violence (accessed 5 August 2009). 
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As members of  a terror group, Boko Haram jihadists derive their power through the 
use of  brutal force; but they also rely on the media to spread their ideology, extend 
their brutality, intimidate their enemies, and recruit new adherents.41 Their use of  
media began long before the commencement of  their insurgency. Earlier, when they 
were still operating as a peaceful movement, Boko Haram leaders had established a 
‘Public Awareness Department’, which was mainly responsible for the production 
and distribution of  their propaganda materials, liaising with the media, and recruiting 
members. It was run by the group’s spokesman, known variously as Abul Qaqa or Abu 
Darda or Abu Zaid42—all pseudonyms used by the group to hide their identity as they 
tend to be exposed to higher risks. Unlike the bureaucratic setting of  the Nigerian 
Army’s communications team (which is often based on impersonal governmental 
formality), in the Boko Haram structure a spokesman is usually a senior member of  
the group’s Shura (Supreme Council) and a close associate of  its leader.43 This is a key 
feature of  the organisation that ensures the centrality of  media in the jihadists’ overall 
strategy. 
An Obsession with Information Control
Despite the sharp contrast in the structures of  their communications teams, however, the 
Nigerian Army and Boko Haram share a common obsession with information control. 
They have demonstrated this in multiple ways, with Boko Haram showing greater 
ingenuity. Even when they were operating openly as a peaceful Islamic youth movement, 
the Boko Haram leaders had evidently maintained strict control of  the information 
they were releasing to the public. They were not attracting the attention of  the news 
media in their early days because they were just one of  several religious movements 
mushrooming in different parts of  the country. And even when they were producing 
and selling recorded cassettes of  the fiery sermons and speeches of  their founder and 
of  his deputies, Shekau and Nur,44 not much media attention was given to them because 
in northern Nigeria it was not unusual for religious groups to be critical of  government. 
Their inflammatory sermons were, of  course, attracting security scrutiny, but the news 
media showed no interest in the group. It was only when the group members began to 
clash with security agents that such interest developed. And they too made concerted 
efforts to cultivate relationships with journalists. This, though, did not stop them from 
killing and intimidating journalists and attacking media organisations that published 
41 Abubakar, ‘Communicating Violence’.
42 Idris, Hamza, ‘Boko Haram Spox Abul Qaqa Captured’, Daily Trust, 2 February 2012: http://www.
dailytrust.com.ng/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=153791:boko-haram-spox-abul-qa-
qa-captured&catid=2:lead-stories&Itemid=8 (accessed 2 February 2012). 
43 Ibid.
44 Abubakar, ‘Communicating Violence’.
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reports they dislike45—further evidence of  their obsession with information control. 
The stronger they grew, the more they exerted their control on information flow. This 
was clearly demonstrated when they established their caliphate in 2014.  According 
to many journalists who covered the region, the militants maintained a near-absolute 
control of  information flow during their reign in the seized territory. The little that the 
outside world heard about the happenings there came from the fragmented accounts 
of  those lucky enough to escape from the territory—and the narratives of  the Boko 
Haram themselves. The group maintained an effective news blackout there throughout 
their reign. Journalists had no access to the caliphate. Safety concerns and logistics were, 
understandably, significant factors, but the primary reason was the insurgents’ mistrust 
of  people who do not belong to their group. When they decided what they wanted 
the outside world to know about the caliphate, they would produce video and audio 
recordings and hand them over to journalists and media outlets through emissaries, or 
upload them directly to the internet.46
The Army’s fixation with information control is also unhidden. Over-centralisation of  
authority and deliberate denial of  information are among the techniques they use to 
ensure control. In the first three years of  its confrontation with Boko Haram (July 
2009 to June 2012), the Army had allowed its unit in Maiduguri, which was mostly 
directly involved in the fight, to communicate directly with the media. The officers there 
would inform the public of  the situation on the ground, speak to journalists, issue press 
releases, and offer guided tours of  the areas affected by the conflict. But this approach 
was abandoned in favour of  an over-centralised system, under which virtually only the 
Defence Headquarters or the Army Headquarters in Abuja would make comments 
on events happening in remote areas of  the northeast. Local commanders and local 
army public relations officers, who were fully aware of  what was happening in their 
areas, would decline to share such information with local journalists. They would 
instead refer them to the Defence Headquarters. Journalists in the northeast would 
get a hint of  an incident happening within their locality and seek confirmation from 
the local commander or the unit’s public relations officer, only to be referred on to 
the Defence Headquarters in Abuja as the sole source of  such information. Military 
officials at the Defence Headquarters usually would not respond to such queries; they 
would just disseminate information when they saw fit. The Nigerian Army claims that 
its information dissemination system is decentralised because it has public relations 
officers at several different levels, but in reality these officers, and even the brigade 
commanders, are not always given the authority to release useful information to the 
public.
45 Smith, Boko Haram.
46 Abubakar, ‘Communicating Violence’.
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Deliberate denial of  access to military-controlled areas and intimidation of  journalists 
who dare to go there are two other methods the military employs for information 
control. The Army’s detention of  Al-Jazeera journalists, who went to Maiduguri in 
March 2015 to report on the insurgency ahead of  the 2015 general elections, illustrates 
this.47 Common excuses given by the military when preventing access to certain areas 
include security concerns and fear for the safety of  the journalists. But many journalists 
who have covered the crisis believe that the Army simply didn’t want them to report 
what was happening there. Since the beginning of  the insurgency, there have always 
been areas that journalists could not access because they were under the control of  
Boko Haram or the Army, and guided tours of  the Army-controlled areas wouldn’t 
always give journalists the information they were looking for. Agence France-Presse 
(AFP) correspondent Mike Smith, who participated in one such tour organised by 
the Army along with other journalists, expressed disappointment with the quality of  
the information he received.48 There were improvements, though, especially after the 
military had regained control of  most of  the area; many journalists who were taken on 
the later tours came back with useful footage and detailed information. 
This, however, does not compensate for the more serious cases of  the Army’s intolerance 
of  media coverage of  the insurgency. One such case was the decision made in 2014 to 
confiscate and destroy copies of  several editions of  newspapers across the country—
another testimony to the Army’s obsession with information control. For many days in 
June of  that year, soldiers seized and destroyed bundles of  newspapers from at least 
ten media houses for ‘security’ reasons, but many regarded this action as a reprisal for 
the newspapers’ coverage of  their poor performance in the fight against Boko Haram.49 
Civil society organisations and advocacy groups expressed dismay over the action.50 The 
Army’s claims of  receiving intelligence reports indicating movements of  dangerous 
materials via newspaper distribution vehicles were never substantiated, and the anger 
of  the newspapers’ proprietors was never in doubt—the impulse to suppress criticism 
was unhelpful to the military’s strategic communications efforts.   
47 The Guardian, ‘Al-Jazeera Calls for Release of  Two Journalists Held in Nigeria’, 31 March 2015: 
https://www.theguardian.com/media/2015/mar/31/al-jazeera-calls-for-release-of-two-journalists-
held-in-nigeria (accessed 4 April 2015). Al-Jazeera, ‘Nigeria Releases Detained Al-Jazeera Journalists’, 
5 April 2015: http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/04/nigeria-releases-detained-al-jazeera-journal-
ists-150405161952385.html (accessed 11 May 2015).
48 Smith, Boko Haram.
49 Freedom House, ‘Freedom of  the Press 2015 – Nigeria’, 28 April 2015: https://freedomhouse.org/
report/freedom-press/2015/nigeria (accessed 28 April 2015). 
50 Reporters Sans Frontières (Reporters Without Border), 11 June 2014: https://rsf.org/en/news/army-seiz-
es-newspaper-issues-day-after-day-security-grounds (accessed 12 June 2014). Committee to Protect Jour-
nalists, 4 June 2014: https://cpj.org/2014/06/nigerian-military-seizes-leading-newspapers.php (accessed 
7 June 2014). 
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Direct Engagement with the Mainstream Media
The aversion of  both Boko Haram and the Army to media scrutiny does not deter 
either from seeking media support. The jihadists in particular rely on media to do much 
of  their work. After all, they put it at the centre of  their overall strategy from the 
outset. Whether it be small-scale media (audio cassettes and leaflets), legacy media, 
or social media, Boko Haram militants never ignore the opportunities the media 
provide—however, their key target has always been the mainstream media. As stated 
earlier, before turning to violence, the insurgents were not getting the attention of  
the mainstream news media. But they did have a taste of  the prestige it could confer 
when local broadcast stations aired some speeches given by their group’s founder. 
As a young preacher, Yusuf ’s sermons propelled him into the public arena; some of  
the speeches he had made at Muslim youth conferences were aired by local broadcast 
stations in Borno State. When he became too critical of  the government, the stations 
shunned him.51 This apparently taught him and his followers a lesson about relating to 
the mainstream media. When their radicalism brought them into open confrontations 
with the authorities, they actively cultivated relationships with independent journalists 
to have them reflect Boko Haram’s side of  the story. The confrontations naturally drew 
media attention, and because the insurgents were willing and eager to talk, their stories 
were reaching wider audiences. They maintained contact with journalists and often 
held news briefings at their headquarters in Maiduguri. ‘Journalists who attended those 
briefings said the group’s founder would first complain about alleged harassment of  
his followers by security operatives and then denounce Western culture and express his 
desire to turn Nigeria into a Salafist state.’52 The peak period of  Boko Haram’s open 
engagement with the mainstream media was from the middle of  June 2009 to the end 
of  July 2009, when its members were regularly clashing with the police. In those weeks 
Yusuf  spoke frequently with journalists, threatening retaliations for the killings of  his 
followers.53 But the intensity of  the July 2009 uprising and its brutal suppression ended 
Boko Haram’s open media relations approach. The insurgents had to devise new ways 
of  engaging with the media.
The power of  the media to define issues in the public mind provides sufficient 
motivation for Boko Haram to endeavour to sustain the engagement. Apart from 
51 Abubakar, ‘Communicating Violence’.
52 Ibid., p. 204.
53 Smith, Boko Haram. 
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its status-conferring role,54 which the group’s leaders must have noticed in their early 
encounters, the media does equally have an agenda-setting function—a key factor of  its 
attraction to jihadists.55 From the days of  Walter Lippmann’s identification of  the media’s 
central role in shaping public opinion56 to the current era of  sophisticated branding and 
strategic communications, agenda-setting theory—‘the transfer of  salience from the 
media agenda to the public agenda’57—has always been a guiding principle of  those 
who seek to use (or manipulate) the media to attain their goals. Although numerous 
audience studies have highlighted the limits of  media ‘effects’ on its audiences,58 state 
and non-state actors will always want to leverage whatever level of  influence the media 
can wield. Theorists of  journalism have argued that the media’s ability to place issues 
on the public agenda is a significant factor in shaping people’s minds. ‘The media not 
only can be successful in telling us what to think about, they also can be successful in 
telling us how to think about it.’59 The spread of  this perspective explains the centrality of  
media in the battle for hearts and minds. And that was perhaps why the Boko Haram 
insurgents were keen to maintain their contacts with the mainstream media, even after 
being pushed underground, as will be seen later.
The Army’s direct relationship with the mainstream media was more straightforward. 
Being a well-established institution that had formal contacts with the media industry long 
before its encounter with the insurgency, the Army reinvigorated its communications 
structure and utilised the services of  legacy media in its counter-insurgency campaigns. 
As stated earlier, the Defence Headquarters’ information department, FOSSRA, the 
Army’s public relations units, and so on are all involved. They regularly issue press 
releases, hold news conferences, visit media houses, and organise (in the case of  
FOSSRA) monthly interactive sessions with journalists. They also employ the services 
54 Lazarsfeld, Paul and Robert Merton, ‘Mass Communication, Popular Taste and Organized Social 
Action’ in L. Bryson, ed., The Communication of  Ideas, (New York: Harper Row, 1948), pp. 88–107. See also 
Wright, Charles, ‘Functional Analysis and Mass Communication’, Public Opinion Quarterly, 24(4), (1960), 
605–620.
55 See Weimann, ‘The Theater of  Terror’. 
56 Lippmann, Walter, Public Opinion, (New York: Macmillan, 1922).
57 McCombs, Maxwell, ‘A Look at Agenda-setting Past, Present and Future’, Journalism Studies, 6(4), 
(2005), p. 543.
58 Decades of  audience studies point to the limits of  media influence. The literature on this is vast, but 
the following works provide a range of  examples: Klapper, Joseph, The Effects of  Mass Communication, 
(Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1960); Morley, David, The ‘Nationwide’ Audience, (London: British Film 
Institute, 1980); Ang, Ien, Living Room Wars: Rethinking Media Audiences for a Postmodern World, (London: 
Routledge, 1996); Abubakar, Abdullahi Tasiu, ‘Selective Believability: A Perspective on Africans’ Interac-
tions with Global Media’, Journal of  African Media Studies, 5(2), (2013), 219–236; and Abubakar, Abdullahi 
Tasiu, ‘Audience Participation and BBC’s Digital Quest in Nigeria’ in Everyday Media Culture in Africa: 
Audiences and Users, eds. W. Willems and W. Mano, (Oxford: Routledge, 2017), pp. 140–160.
59 McCombs, ‘A Look at Agenda-setting Past, Present and Future’, p. 546 (italics original).
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of  public relations consultants.60 So, in terms of  maintaining a direct relationship with 
the media regarding its counter-insurgency work, the public relations machine of  the 
armed forces has been quite active. For instance, in two years alone (from mid-2013 to 
mid-2015) the army ‘issued over 3000 media contents including newsworthy items and 
publications’.61 This emboldened the then National Security Adviser to claim that the 
military had used its cordial relationship with the media to effectively counter Boko 
Haram’s propaganda.62  
The military’s trust in the power of  the legacy media could also be seen in their decision 
to set up their own radio station in Abuja in 2015 to promote ‘counter-terrorism 
operations’.63 And they have been expanding both its services and its reach. The main 
snag, though, is that a single false statement from the military authorities (as noted in 
the opening part of  this piece) is capable of  undoing months of  hard work. And their 
inability to always match words with actions is an equally major drawback. This was 
evident when the Army was losing territory to Boko Haram in 2014–2015. The image 
of  cowardly soldiers running away from marauding jihadi fighters and abandoning their 
positions and weapons could not be repaired by propaganda alone. The Army had to 
retake most of  the seized territory and demonstrate that they were gaining control 
before they began to erase that image of  cowardice—and get it reflected in the media. 
As public diplomacy scholar Nicholas Cull argues, the most effective voice of  an actor 
is ‘not what it says but what it does’.64
Psychological Operations and Guerrilla Tactics
Apart from employing traditional media relations methods, both the Army and Boko 
Haram have also used unconventional approaches in their engagement with the 
media. The techniques they deploy are mostly reactive (though some are proactive) 
and necessitated by the situations in which they find themselves. When Boko Haram 
went underground—making open contact with journalists dangerous and mostly 
impossible—they devised a guerrilla media strategy. ‘This consisted of  using anonymous 
mobile phone lines to deliver messages to journalists, emailing materials to media houses 
using fake addresses, and organising teleconferences from secret locations.’65 It worked 
particularly well from the middle of  2011 to the early part of  2012, when the militants 
60 Shuaib, Boko Haram Media War.
61 Ibid., p. 10. 
62 Ibid.  
63 Daily Trust, ‘Armed Forces Launch Radio Station’, 24 May 2015: https://www.dailytrust.com.ng/sun-
day/index.php/news/20798-armed-forces-launch-radio-station (accessed 24 May 2015).  
64 Cull, Nicholas, Public Diplomacy: Lessons from the Past (CPD Perspectives on Public Diplomacy), (Los 
Angeles: Figueroa Press, 2009), p. 27.  
65 Abubakar, ‘Communicating Violence’, pp. 204–205.
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were deeply involved in urban guerrilla warfare. But it was terminated after the Nigerian 
secret police tracked down the jihadists’ two spokesmen, killed one, and arrested the 
other.66
The group then came up with a new approach—a direct drop strategy. They would 
produce video and audio messages and leaflets and deliver them discreetly to journalists.67 
Because of  their strong faith in propaganda, Boko Haram fighters often travel with 
their cameramen to record operations. Their leaders also record sermons and messages. 
Those they wanted to publicise during this period were usually delivered to journalists 
through emissaries, while leaflets were mostly dropped in places where journalists 
and the public would see them. It was through this approach that they staged their 
biggest publicity coup—when they handed over the video of  the Chibok schoolgirls 
they abducted in 2014 to an AFP journalist.68 Security agents eventually detected and 
disrupted this strategy too, but not before it had generated the global media attention 
the group craves.
The Army’s unconventional approach to communicating with the mainstream media 
was anchored on the desire to manage the security challenges created by Boko Haram’s 
violence. Military officials use their contacts with the media to persuade editors 
to suppress stories they deem inimical to national security. This approach does not 
involve using threat or intimidation, rather it relies on moral suasion and appealing to 
journalists’ sense of  patriotism to make them handle issues in a way that is helpful to the 
Army’s counter-insurgency mission. Some of  the journalists interviewed for this article 
admitted that they had, at one time or another, handled stories based on appeals from 
their editors or directly from the security agencies regarding security concerns caused 
by the Boko Haram crisis. The Army was more successful in using this approach when 
Boko Haram’s use of  violence was at its peak. There was a collective fear then, even 
among journalists and media establishments, some of  whom were victims of  Boko 
Haram’s attacks. The support the security services received from the media might have 
come from the need to address this. There was confirmation that the security services 
did receive this support. ‘We received massive and unprecedented support from the 
local and foreign media for the accomplishment of  our nation in the war on terror.’69 
The other approach the Nigerian Army employed in countering the Boko Haram 
insurgency was psychological operations. Details for this are hard to decipher, but the 
Army’s former media consultant admitted that it was part of  their strategy.
66 Idris, ‘Boko Haram Spox Abul Qaqa Captured’.
67 Abubakar, ‘Communicating Violence’.
68 Ibid.
69 Former National Security Adviser Dasuki made this comment in the foreword he wrote in Shuaib’s 
book, Boko Haram Media War: An Encounter with the Spymaster, p. 10.
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We also deployed psychological operations (PSYOP) in conveying appropriate narratives 
through right communication channels in persuading and convincing target audiences on 
specific objectives. Though strategies under PSYOP are strictly confidential, including 
self-censorship, few editors are aware of  some of  the initiatives to counter wicked 
propaganda and tackle information that could rubbish the nation’s integrity.70
The extent to which the Army has engaged in PsyOps is difficult to know, and that 
is the nature of  PsyOps. They have never publicly explained why they engaged in 
psychological operations—nor have they even admitted using them. There are debates 
over the inclusion of  PsyOps in strategic communications. Security expert James 
Farwell argues that PsyOps aim at influencing and shaping audiences’ behaviour—the 
key objectives of  strategic communications.71 NATO endorses them.72 But defence 
officials at the Pentagon in America were so worried about the pejorative connotations 
of  PsyOps they rebranded them Military Information Support Operations (MISO).73 
And Williams has argued that since psychological operations would involve the 
deliberate use of  disinformation, employing them in strategic communications could 
be counterproductive.74 The risk usually lies in the public uncovering the truth—which 
they sometimes do—and losing their trust. Being caught lying is costlier for the Nigerian 
Army than for Boko Haram because the public regard the group as an outcast and 
do not always expect honesty from its members. Ironically, as noted earlier, on many 
occasions Boko Haram gave more credible accounts of  events than the Army did. And 
this has dented the Army’s strategic communications campaigns. However, there is an 
area where they are making progress—digital engagement—though there, too, it was 
the jihadists who made the first move. 
Digital Engagement
A strategy common to both the Army and Boko Haram was the use of  digital 
technology and online media to advance their causes. Boko Haram has enjoyed a head 
start in this. From uploading their videos and audios on the internet to opening and 
operating social media accounts, the insurgents have demonstrated adequate technical 
skill to help transform them into ‘digital terrorists’. Three factors account for this: Boko 
Haram’s need to disseminate propaganda; the ease with which the new technology can 
be used; and assistance from international jihadists. When the Nigerian security forces 
blocked almost all of  Boko Haram’s chances to contact journalists and the mainstream 
media physically, the militants were compelled to devise new ways of  reaching the 
70 Shuaib, Boko Haram Media War, p. 16.
71 Farwell, Persuasion and Power.
72 See NATO, ‘NATO Strategic Communications Policy’.
73 Farwell, Persuasion and Power.
74 Williams, ‘Weaponised Honesty’.
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public. And they were probably surprised to find out how easy and how effective new 
technology could be in doing this. They first discovered YouTube and began to upload 
their messages directly onto the video-sharing site.75 As soon as they uploaded their 
videos, they would usually alert journalists and direct them to links where the videos 
could be found. YouTube regularly removes these videos from its site,76 but often not 
fast enough to prevent the newsworthy ones from making headlines in the mainstream 
media, which is the main objective of  the jihadists.77 
Boko Haram’s digital endeavours continued to develop. On 18 January 2015 
they launched their first Twitter account, @Alurwa_Alwuthqa,78 (Figure 1) 
where they uploaded a variety of  propaganda messages, including videos of  
child soldiers. Jihadists from the so-called Islamic State group—to whom 
Boko Haram has pledged allegiance79—were quick to promote the account.80 
There was also a rapid improvement in the production quality of  their materials. Slick 
and well-produced videos featuring ‘music, graphics and slow motion shots’ replaced 
75 AFP, ‘Boko Haram: Changing Media Strategy for a Wider Conflict?’ Daily Mail. 20 February 2015: 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/afp/article-2961665/Boko-Haram-changing-media-strategy-wid-
er-conflict.html (accessed 21 February 2015).
76 Ibid.
77 Abubakar, ‘Communicating Violence’. 
78 BBC Monitoring, ‘Is Islamic State Shaping Boko Haram Media?’, 7 March 2015: http://www.bbc.
co.uk/news/world-africa-31522469 (accessed 7 March 2015). 
79 Callimachi, Rukmini, (2015) ‘Boko Haram Generates Uncertainty with Pledge of  Allegiance to Islamic 
State’, The New York Times, 7 March 2015: http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/08/world/africa/boko-ha-
ram-is-said-to-pledge-allegiance-to-islamic-state.html?smid=nytcore-iphone-share&smprod=nytcore-ip-
hone&_r=0 (accessed 8 March 2015).
80 BBC Monitoring, ‘Is Islamic State Shaping Boko Haram Media?’ 
Figure 1: Boko Haram’s first Twitter account @Alurwa_Alwuthqa, which could be translated 
as ‘The Indissoluble Link’, was opened in January 2015. It was later shut down by Twitter. 
[Image accessed on 28 January 2015].
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their previous grainy ‘amateurish footage’.81 Once they discovered the effectiveness of  
social media, they worked on learning how to use it more effectively. Their Twitter 
account was frequently suspended,82 but usually long after the content had been picked 
up by the mainstream media and published or broadcast to a wider audience.
The Army’s digital strategy for counter-insurgency involves the deployment of  new 
technology and the use of  the internet and social media both to disrupt Boko Haram’s 
online activities and to counter their propaganda. The military and other security services 
had engaged in cyber activities, including running their own websites and carrying out 
official business online, well before the emergence of  the Boko Haram crisis. As the 
crisis developed, they extended their remits to include the fight against the insurgency. 
In this, too, the Army is leading the campaign, followed by the Defence Headquarters. 
The Nigerian Air Force, the Nigeria Police Force, and related bodies also employ digital 
strategy. 
The Army’s website (http://www.army.mil.ng) is dominated by reports of  the 
military’s counter-insurgency efforts. A banner with pictures of  ‘Boko Haram 
suspects wanted by the Nigerian Army’ is placed at the top of  the homepage, on 
the right-hand side (Figure 2)83—clicking on it expands the banner to a full page. 
81 AFP, ‘Boko Haram’
82 BBC Monitoring, ‘Is Islamic State Shaping Boko Haram Media?’ 
83 The banner, which shows a big picture of  Boko Haram leader Shekau at the centre surrounded by 
pictures of  other commanders, has been widely circulated and posted in many public places including 
airports across Nigeria.
Figure 2. The homepage of  the Nigerian Army website. At the top, on the right-hand side is 
the poster of  ‘BOKO HARAM SUSPECTS WANTED BY THE NIGERIAN ARMY’. 
[Screenshot taken 19 October 2017].
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Stories of  the Army’s various operations—troops intercepting suicide bombers, Boko 
Haram commanders surrendering, gallant officers receiving promotions, and Boko 
Haram terrorists being arrested—are the main contents of  the site (see Figures 3, 4, 5, and 
6). The websites of  the Defence Headquarters (http://defencehq.mil.ng), the Nigerian 
Air Force (http://www.airforce.mil.ng), and the Nigeria Police Force (http://npf.gov.ng) 
also regularly feature related stories, though not at the same scale as the Army’s. The Air 
Force sometimes posts videos of  successful bombardments of  Boko Haram targets on 
its website.84 Such videos are often shared by other security services and usually uploaded 
on YouTube for wider circulation (see Figures 7, 8, and 9).
84 One of  them was its attack on the militants in Sambisa Forest on 8 August 2017. See Nigerian Air 
Force, ‘Nigerian Air Force Destroys Boko Haram Hideout’, 10 August 2017: http://www.airforce.mil.ng/
post nigerian_air_force_destroys_boko_haram_hideout (accessed 20 August 2017).
Figure 3. Nigerian Army website.  
[Screenshot taken 20 September 2017].
Figure 4. Nigerian Army website.  
[Screenshot taken 19 October 2017].
Figure 5. Nigerian Army website. 
[Screenshot taken 20 September 2017].
Figure 6. Nigerian Army website. 
[Screenshot taken 20 October 2017].
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Figure 9. One of  the videos of  the Nigerian Air Force’s attack on Boko Haram in Parisu, Bor-
no State. [Posted on YouTube 30 May 2017].
Figure 7. Nigerian Air Force video showing 
their strike on Boko Haram target in 
Sambisa.
Figure 8. Nigerian Air Force video showing 
their strike on Boko Haram target. [Posted on 
YouTube by the Nigerian Air Force 7 March 
2017].
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The armed forces also actively use social media in their counter-insurgency strategy, 
with the Army and Defence Headquarters taking the lead here, too. The most popular 
platforms they use are Twitter and Facebook, though the Defence Headquarters’ 
Facebook account did not seem to be active as of  20 October 2017 (Figure 10). Their 
official Twitter account, @DefenceInfoNG, has been very active (Figure 11). It has 
been so effective that it became a target for cyber criminals who created a fake Twitter 
account using the same logo. In August 2017 the Defence Headquarters had to alert 
the public about this, vowing to track down ‘the perpetrator of  this heinous act’.85 The 
Army’s Twitter account, @HQNigerianArmy, is even more popular (Figure 12). On 
20 October 2017 it showed 245,615 followers and 2,668 tweets, compared to Defence 
Headquarters’ 194,092 followers and 1,770 tweets. The Nigerian Army’s Facebook 
page—https://www.facebook.com/NigerianArmy/ (Figure 13)—has an even wider 
reach in Nigeria; this is where they embed pictures and videos promoting their counter-
terror activities. The security forces interact and promote one another’s activities 
extensively. News outlets keenly monitor these accounts as they are a significant source 
of  counter-insurgency-related stories.
85 The Nation, ‘Beware of  fake twitter handle, DHQ warns’, 24 August 2017: http://thenationonlineng.
net/beware-of-fake-twitter-handle-dhq-warns/ (accessed 24 August 2017).
Figure 10. Inactive Facebook account of  
the Defence Headquarters [Screenshot 
taken 20 October 2017].
Figure 11. Defence Headquarters active Twitter 
account [Screenshot taken 20 October 2017].
Figure 12. Twitter account of  the Nigerian 
Army [Screenshot taken 20 October 
2017].
Figure 13. Nigerian Army’s Facebook account 
page [Screenshot taken 20 October 2017].
Strategic Communications, Boko Haram, and Counter-Insurgency
161
The open engagement of  the security forces with the digital media is wide-ranging and 
generally robust, but they also use technology in their covert operations to counter the 
jihadists. What they do exactly is unclear, but officials indicate that they are secretly 
using technological expertise to dislodge Boko Haram from cyberspace. Director of  
Defence Information Major General John Enenche has made comments to this effect. 
‘We have our strategic media centres that monitor the social media to be able to sieve 
out and react to all the ones that will be anti-government, be anti-military, (and) be anti-
security,’ he said. ‘We have measures in place, scientific measures to be able to sieve this 
information and also to get the public and let them know that some of  this information 
they are getting is not genuine.’86 There are numerous anti-Boko Haram videos online—
some of  them purporting to come directly from the group or showing the capture and 
killing of  its leader (Figure 14)—which many believe were uploaded to the internet by 
the security services. Apart from helping to get Boko Haram videos removed from 
YouTube, and their social media accounts suspended (Boko Haram has no active social 
media account as of  20 October 2017), the Army frequently disrupts the online activities 
of  the jihadists, distorts their messages, and sometimes blocks access to the content of  
their accounts. They have largely managed to contain the militants on this front.
86 Daily Trust, ‘Nigerian Army Now Monitors What You Post on Social Media,’ 23 August 2017: https://
www.dailytrust.com.ng/news/online-special/nigerian-army-now-monitors-what-you-post-on-social-me-
dia/211303.html (accessed 23 August 2017).
Figure 14. A video claiming that Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau was captured and killed. 
But Shekau has repeatedly released a counter video denying that he was killed [Screenshot 
taken 20 September 2017].
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The Media, Newsworthiness, Insurgency, and Counter-Insurgency
This containment, however, is not enough to eliminate the ability of  Boko Haram 
jihadists to manipulate the media and advance their cause. Some factors are simply 
beyond the control of  the Nigerian security forces—the ideological orientations of  
various media outlets and the expectations of  their audiences. Media practitioners and 
their audiences are orientated in such a way that certain activities of  Boko Haram attract 
their attention more than others. And this has theoretical foundations. In their seminal 
work The Structure of  Foreign News,87 Johan Galtung and Mari Ruge argue that journalists 
have a set of  criteria—news values—which they use to determine the newsworthiness 
of  events. They identify twelve such criteria—such as frequency; threshold; relevance; 
unexpectedness; unpredictability; and negativity—and conclude that the more an 
event meets these criteria, the higher the possibility of  its being reported by media 
and regarded by audiences as news.88 Although further studies have since added other 
factors and modified some of  Galtung and Ruge’s original criteria,89 Boko Haram 
activities fit well into many of  them. ‘The more negative the event in its consequences, 
the more probable that it will become a news item.’90 Whether it was the kidnapping of  
schoolgirls, the bombing of  markets, or the beheading of  innocent civilians, each major 
action carried out by Boko Haram militants has intense negative consequences and is 
therefore deemed newsworthy. ‘Events have to be unexpected or rare, or preferably 
both, to become good news.’91 Many of  the actions taken by Boko Haram jihadists were 
unexpected. And even the expected actions often meet the newsworthiness criteria of  
negativity and continuity. For, as Galtung and Ruge note, ‘once something has hit the 
headlines and been defined as “news”, then it will continue to be defined as news for 
some time even if  the amplitude is drastically reduced’.92
The concepts of  news values and agenda setting (discussed earlier) are the engines 
that empower Boko Haram and other insurgents and terror groups to manipulate the 
media. The increasing competition for audience shares or expansion of  readership, 
the incessant pursuit of  drama and controversy, and the intense pressure arising from 
24/7 news coverage have unwittingly made media more vulnerable to terrorists and 
insurgents.
87 Galtung, Johan and Ruge, Mari Holmboe, ‘The Structure of  Foreign News: The Presentation of  the 
Congo, Cuba and Cyprus Crises in Four Norwegian Newspapers’, Journal of  Peace Research, 2(1), (1965), 
64–91.
88 Ibid.
89 Harcup, Tony and O’Neill, Deirdre, ‘What Is News? News Values Revisited (Again)’, Journalism Studies, 
(2016), DOI: 10.1080/1461670X.2016.1150193. 
90 Galtung and Ruge, ‘The Structure of  Foreign News’, p. 68.
91 Ibid., p. 67.
92 Ibid. 
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As long as terrorists offer visuals and sound bites, drama, threats, and human interest 
tales, the news media will report—and actually over-report—on their actions and causes 
at the expense of  other and more important news. Terrorism fits into the infotainment 
mold that the news media increasingly prefers and offers villains and heroes the promise 
to attract new audiences and keep existing ones.93
Scholars of  terrorism and counter-insurgency experts have argued that publicity is 
the ‘oxygen or lifeblood’94 of  terrorists and that the frenzied media coverage of  their 
activities is empowering them. Professor of  Communication Gabriel Weimann puts 
it succinctly: ‘More than anything else, publicity is the lifeblood of  terrorism and the 
media, therefore, are playing a central role in the calculus of  terrorism and through their 
choices can serve to minimize or magnify terrorist violence’.95 There are others who 
argue that the media’s motive in playing up terrorists’ stories is to impel the authorities 
to take tough actions against them.96 Whatever the motives, insurgents relish the media 
attention they are receiving. It is not that journalists cover insurgencies or terrorism with 
the deliberate intent of  promoting such activities; it is just that insurgents and terrorists 
are willing to do anything to attain their goals. Unless there is a radical reorientation of  
the concept of  news and of  the nature of  media coverage, opportunistic insurgents 
will continue to reap benefits from the questionable premises of  the news media’s 
orientation. 
Conclusion 
The Nigerian Armed Forces and Boko Haram insurgents have engaged actively 
in strategic communications campaigns in pursuit of  their goals. The jihadists have 
succeeded in attracting global media attention, mainly by the sheer scale of  their violence 
and their infamies, but also by the effective use of  their communications strategies. The 
Army is at the forefront of  Nigeria’s effort to counter these strategies. It uses its formal 
communications structure and other methods to challenge their narratives and disrupt 
their media strategies. The military has recorded some successes in containing the 
insurgents, largely because of  the upper hand it has gained on the physical battlefield, 
but also because of  waning media interest in the militants due to their diminishing 
capacity to stage headline-grabbing attacks. 
The Army’s narrow conception of  strategic communications—often limiting it to 
public relations work and spin—has sometimes had costly consequences, harming 
93 Nacos, Mass-mediated Terrorism, pg. x.
94 Ibid., pg. 30.
95 Weimann, ‘The Role of  the Media in Propagating Terrorism’, p. 197. 
96 See, for example, Spencer, Alexander, ‘The social construction of  terrorism: media, metaphors and 
policy implications’, Journal of  International Relations and Development, 15(3), (2012), 393–419. 
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its credibility and empowering the insurgents. Yet, the main factor enhancing Boko 
Haram’s communications efforts seems to be the media’s fixation on jihadi stories. The 
militants do demonstrate remarkable media skills and fully utilise the opportunities 
offered by the online and social media, but the biggest boost to their publicity has 
been the mainstream media’s preoccupation with their stories. As media scholar 
Brigitte Nacos asserts, ‘the mainstream news media remain indispensable for terrorist 
propaganda because conventional news outlets tend to alert the general public to the 
most sensational features and developments in terrorists’ mass self-communication via 
internet sites and social media networking’.97
However, as pointed out earlier, the media do not cover insurgency or terrorism 
with the intent of  enhancing them. They cover them as part of  their basic function 
to inform the public, based on the guiding principles of  their profession. There are, 
no doubt, excesses that need to be addressed, but downplaying the risks of  terrorist 
attacks wouldn’t necessarily be part of  the solution. Doing so would carry the inherent 
danger of  undermining public safety. Both the insurgent groups and those responsible 
for counter-insurgency work are aware of  this dilemma—and it is the insurgents who 
benefit from it. There is a strong need to review the concept of  news and how it 
is covered. Counter-insurgency strategists also ought to devise ways of  minimising 
insurgents’ ability to manipulate the media. The Nigerian Armed Forces have obviously 
made progress with their counter-insurgency campaigns. To be clear, their success 
has come more through the use of  force (e.g. killing Boko Haram spokesmen and 
commanders, and retaking captured territory) than the use of  soft power (effective 
strategic communications campaigns). To enhance their soft power, the Nigerian Armed 
Forces would have to expand their strategic communications remits by incorporating 
into them the services of  rich Nigerian cultural institutions—such as the Nollywood 
and Kannywood film industries98 —and enlisting the support of  respected religious 
bodies. Even more importantly, they should anchor their communications strategy on 
credible narratives. Credibility is the cornerstone of  effective narratives, and honesty—
or the perception of  it—is a necessary condition for the long-term efficacy of  strategic 
communications.
97 Nacos, Mass-mediated Terrorism, p. 36.
98 Nigeria has a booming film industry that has received international recognition and has made a 
significant impact on the country’s cultural scene. Films could be good vehicles for conveying strategic 
messages. See McCain, Carmen, ‘Video Exposé: Metafiction and Message in Nigerian Films’, Journal 
of  African Cinemas, 4(1), (2012), 25–57. One Kannywood producer, Zaharaddeen Sani, has produced 
a film with such intent, but it remains a private individual effort and its first screening was planned 
outside Nigeria (see Premium Times of  24 June 2017: http://www.premiumtimesng.com/entertainment/
kannywood/234994-why-film-depicting-boko-haram-atrocities-wont-premiere-in-nigeria-producer.html 
(accessed 30 June 2017).
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